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Abstract
I develop a model with status concerns to analyze how different economic
factors affect female participation, average household income and wage, as
well as the welfare of both stay-at-home and working wives. Reductions in the
price of domestic goods and increases in female wages have positive effects on
female participation. Increases in male wages have different effects on female
participation depending on whether they affect female wages or not. Events
that lead to increases in female participation are usually associated with
decreases in the welfare of stay-at-home wives, but are not necessarily
associated with increases in welfare of working wives.
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1. Introduction
Women‟s labor force participation has increased dramatically over the second half of the
twentieth century. The economic literature has put forward various explanations for this
phenomenon, explanations that are mostly associated with positive developments that took place
in women‟s lives during this time. This paper shows that, paradoxically some of the events that
increase female participation and in most economic models are expected to improve women‟s
welfare, such as decreases in gender wage gap and the price of domestic goods, might have had
negative unintended consequences. The “paradox of declining female happiness” as put forward
by Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) can thus be justified by status concerns with respect to
multiple reference groups in a similar fashion that “the Easterlin paradox” was justified by
relative income concerns (Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008).
Recent literature on female labor force participation focused on dynamic changes in culture
as an engine of increased participation (Fernandez 2007, Escriche 2007, Vendrik 2003, Fortin
2008). Thus, as more women participate in the labor force the expectations regarding what is the
role of women in society adjusts and it is easier for the subsequent generations of women to join
the labor force. Since more and more married women have joined the labor force throughout the
twentieth century, the dominating premise is that women prefer working outside the home. By
changing the culture that kept married women at home, these women were “freed” from
domestic drudgery and given a wider set of options that allowed them to choose the ones that
maximize their welfare.
In this paper, I develop a model that incorporates several factors that are widely believed to
have contributed to the increase in labor participation of married women throughout the second
half of the twentieth century and analyze how these factors affect average household income and
wage in the economy, as well as the welfare of both stay-at-home and working wives. I argue
that once women start joining the labor force, other women will be tempted to join the labor
force as well due to increased inequalities of household income. Their joining the labor force
comes from what they perceive to be a necessity of having an additional income in the household
due to changes in what the society deems an acceptable standard of living. In this sense, this
paper is related to the literature on the "keeping up with the Joneses" where households care
about their relative standard of living.
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The model allows for heterogeneity in women's preference for home production, incorporates
comparisons at household level, and potential feelings of envy and inadequacy due to wage gaps
between women in the labor force and the men with whom they work. Thus women who work
are subject to both improvements in their welfare brought about by the income that they receive,
and decreases in welfare due to having to outsource their home production and having to
compete with the men that already are in the workforce. Each generation of women decides on
their labor participation at the beginning of their life based on wages, male and female, and price
of “home goods” that are prevailing at that time.
In this context I analyze how changes in external factors, such as price of “home goods” and
gender wage gaps affect the decisions of married women to join the labor force and the effect
that these events have on overall welfare of both stay-at-home and working wives.
These experiments are inspired by empirical studies that showed that throughout the
twentieth century price of the “home goods” relative to female wages, as well as wage gender
gap have decreased noticeably. Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) show that
conditional on having positive child care costs, the ratio of child care costs to women‟s earning is
lower in 1988 compared to 1975. They also show that wages of child care workers, which
constitute the most important element of child care costs, have decreased over time. Ferrrero
Martinez and Iza (2004) also argued that recent skill-biased technological change lead to an
increase in skill premium and a relative decrease in the market value of child caring. Greenwood,
Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) argue that the technological revolution that led to a dramatic
decrease in the price of labor savings household durable goods is behind the increase in the
female labor participation. My results are consistent with these studies that found a direct
positive relationship between these events and increased female participation.
Reductions in the price of “home goods” and increases in female wages have a positive effect
on female participation rate. Increases in male wages have different effects on female
participation depending on whether they affect female wages or not. For instance, if female
wages are independent variables, an increase in male wages decrease female participation rate.
Alternatively, I assume that female wages are positive functions of male wages and past female
participation rates. These conjectures are based on the fact that technological advances in the
market place affect the demand for labor in general, being it male or female and wages are also
influenced by the historical trajectory in the labor market of different categories of workers. In
3

this case an increase in male wages leads to increased female participation rate even if it is not
associated with a decrease in gender wage gap.
The effects of these economic shocks on the average household and individual incomes are
of particular interest. Thus an increase in female wage will always be associated with an increase
in average household income, but not necessarily with an increase in average wage. The increase
in female wage leads to increased female participation, and depending on the elasticity of
participation with respect to female wage, it could lead to an increase or decrease in average
wage in the economy. An increase in male wage leads to an increase in the average wage in the
economy, but not necessarily of the average household income depending on whether female
wages are independent or positive functions of male wages.

If female wages are (not)

independent, an increase in male wage leads to (increased) decreased female participation, and to
a(n) (increase) decrease in average household income.
Assuming that female wages are positive functions of male wages and past participation
rates, I analyze what types of equilibria are likely to occur in this model economy. Depending on
whether female wage are increasing, decreasing, or linear function of the past participation rate,
the type of hysteresis generated are associated either with the entrance or the exit from the labor
market of married women. If female wage is an increasing function of past participation rates,
hysteresis is possible if the economy starts from full participation rate. Exiting the labor market
would be possible only if certain low (high) thresholds of male wage (price of “home goods) are
reached. If female wage is a linear or diminishing function of past participation rate hysteresis is
likely if the economy starts from an equilibrium where no women participate in the labor market.
Entering the labor market in this case would require that certain high (low) thresholds of the
male wage (price of “home” good) be reached.
Most economic models would predict that an increase in female labor supply that is a
consequence of what would be generally considered positive events in their lives is associated
with an increase in the welfare of the working women. However the welfare effects of some of
these events on the working woman can be paradoxically negative. I analyze these welfare
effects focusing on both the stay-at-home and working wife. Given that the participation rate
changes over time, a woman with certain characteristics (preferences for the production of the
“home” good) can either work or stay at home depending on the values of parameters of interest:
male, female wage and price of “home” good. Thus the welfare analysis follows what I call a
4

“perennial” woman (i.e. whose behavior of either working or staying at home before and after
the economic shock is constant) as well as an “average” woman (i.e. working or staying at home
wives at a certain time t).
A reduction in the price of “home good” decreases the welfare of the “perennial” stay-athome wives and has an ambiguous effect on the utility of the “perennial” working wives,
depending on how much they care about their household relative income. As the price of “home
goods” decreases, the working wives can buy more of the market good. The effect on the relative
household income is ambiguous. Their household standing improves given that the value of the
stay-at-home wives‟ households decreases by the value of the “home good” as expressed by
price. However, as more women join the labor force the average household income in the
economy might increases, and thus their relative position might deteriorate. Moreover, if female
wage is a function of participation rates, as more women join the labor force their wage
improves. Thus, even though most factors point in the direction that a decrease in “home goods”
price would improve the welfare of the “perennial” working women, the overall welfare effect is
uncertain.
In a similar fashion I find that decreases in male wages or increases in female wages have
negative effects on the welfare of the stay-at-home wife if female wages are independent of male
wages. However if female wages are a positive function of male wages and past participation
rates, a decrease in male wages is associated with a decrease in female wages and participation,
so that the overall welfare effect on the stay-at-home wife becomes ambiguous.
One major factor that affects the welfare of the “average” working women is
compositional. Since women have heterogeneous and time invariant preferences for producing
their own “home goods”, changes in the proportion and thus composition of the women that are
in the labor force have a significant impact on the average welfare. Thus, if more women drop
from the labor force, the effect on the welfare of the “average” working wife is more positive or
less negative than the effect on the “perennial” working wife. If more women join the labor
force, the effect on the welfare of the “average” working wife is more negative or less positive
than on the “perennial” working wife.
The model incorporates comparisons at the household level, as well as at the individual level
in the labor market. In section 3.2 I model female wage to be a positive function of past female
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participation. These conjectures are well supported by the economic literature which will be
briefly reviewed below.

2. Related literature
2.1 Status concerns with different reference groups
The economic literature confirming the importance of income comparisons in the utility
function is quite extensive and keeps growing. Using individual level panel data, Luttmer (2004)
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) show that individuals are happier the larger their income is in
comparison with the income of the reference group and that higher earnings of neighbors are
associated with lower levels of self reported happiness. Dynan and Ravina (2007) find that
people‟s happiness is positively related to how well their group is doing relative to the average in
their geographic area, even after controlling for the level of their own income. Ravina (2007)
estimates an Euler equation derived from a preference specification that includes individual
consumption and the average level of consumption of a geographical reference group. Her results
imply that the strength of positional concerns, captured by the fraction of the consumption of the
reference group that enters the utility function, is close to one third. Frank (2007) provides a
plethora of anecdotal evidence regarding the effects of status concerns on individual behavior.
The implications of the “keeping up with the Joneses” models are used in most instances to
explain saving, consumption behavior as well as labor supply decisions at intensive margins at
the individual level, in a gender-neutral fashion1.
Some authors focus on relative income concerns to explain labor force participation decisions
of married women.

Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) develop a neoclassical model that

incorporates relative income concerns into households‟ utility functions in order to explain
women‟s employment decisions. They also test the model empirically and show that indeed the
women's employment decisions are affected by the incomes of other women with whom relative
income comparisons might be important, such as sisters and sisters-in-law (i.e. married women
are 16 to 25% percent more likely to have an outside employment if their sister‟s husbands earn
more than their own husbands). Park (2005) suggests that married women‟s employment
1

Abel (1990) and Gali (1994) are concerned with the effects of preference interdependence on asset pricing, Caroll,
Overland and Weil (1997, 2000), Liu and Turnovsky (2005) are concerned with their effects on capital
accumulation, savings and growth, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009), Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008)
with their effects on income inequality.
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decisions are influenced by their household‟s relative income. He shows that married women are
more likely to be in the labor force when their husbands‟ relative income is low, and in
particular, married women who worked previously are more likely to stay in the labor market
when their husband‟s relative income is low. Using data on Italian households, Del Boca and
Pasqua (2003) show that the pattern of women employment during 1977-1998 had the effect of
reducing inequality in family incomes.
These concerns about relative income at household level have a major impact on women‟s
decision to join the labor force. However these studies ignore the additional reference group that
is brought about when these women join the labor force (i.e. they reflect only the additional
income and thus the household income advantage that the stay-at-home wives capture from
joining the labor force). Working women however face an additional reference group once they
are in the labor market. As workers, they compare their salaries with their peers and these
comparisons affect their job satisfaction and their welfare and should therefore be incorporated
in their decision process.
The economic literature identifies two aspects of these labor market comparisons. On the one
hand, relatively low wages makes people feel worse off as they feel that their work is not
compensated at a “fair” value. On the other hand, relatively low wages could make them feel
better off as they interpret it as a signal of what they could achieve in their profession or work
organization. Using data on British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) show that workers'
reported satisfaction levels are weakly correlated with their absolute wages, but are significantly
negatively correlated with their comparison wage rates. Bygren (2004) focuses on what
constitutes the reference wage that affects the job satisfaction. He finds that Swedish workers
primarily compare their pay with that of similar others (i.e., others with the same education and
work experience) in their occupation and in the labor market as a whole. More importantly, for
the purpose of this paper, is that his empirical analysis show that the higher the average wage of
the reference groups, the lower the probability of being satisfied with one‟s own. Sloane and
Williams (2000) and Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) using data on British, and
respectively Canadian workers also found that job satisfaction is negatively related to
comparison wages. Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008) show that job satisfaction and
well-being depend on relative pay and the ordinal rank of an individual‟s wage within a
comparison group.
7

Clark, Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2009) provide evidence that in some cases
information effects could be stronger than comparison effects, i.e. workers do not object if their
peers earn more as they feel that those higher earnings are a good indication of their future
prospects. Clark, Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen perform the empirical analysis with data
from Denmark, country that has a very high income and wage mobility. Using colleagues within
the same establishment as a reference group they find that job satisfaction is positively correlated
both with own earnings as well as the average earnings of other workers from within the same
organization. However, if the reference group is uninformative with respect to one‟s earning
potential, it is unlikely that signal outweighs the status motive and thus more likely that low
relative income has a negative effect on one‟s well-being.

2.2 Gender wage gap as function of female participation
In section 3.2, I argue that female participation in the labor market is associated with
externalities regarding female wages (i.e. increased female participation increases the return to
working of all women). In this section I review two lines of arguments regarding why this might
happen.
One argument focuses on network theories in the labor market. Recently, several studies
(Calvo–Armengol and Jackson 2004, 2007, Van der Leij and Buhai 2008) address the issue of
the effects of social networks on employment, wage inequality and occupational segregation.
They argue that when individuals have “an inbreeding bias”, a tendency to associate more
closely with individuals that share the same characteristics, there is sustained inequality in wages
and employment rates across different groups. Calvo–Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that
two groups (i.e. male and female) with two different networks have different employment rates
due to the endogenous decision to drop out of the labor force. Arrow and Borzekowski (2004)
show that, differences in the network connection between black and whites can explain about
15% of the unexplained variation in wages.
Given the evidence that indicate that differences in social networks have an important effect
on wage inequality across groups, the question remains whether males and females belong to
different labor networks. The empirical evidence shows that even though male and female share
what is considered the social space (i.e. live in the same neighborhoods, and go to the same
schools), they don‟t share their networks in terms of the labor market. Berger (1995) provides
8

evidence that women are at a disadvantage in the labor market due to their inferior social
network. She shows that in 1982, women used mostly women contacts in the labor market: 30%
of women use female contacts and only 17% of the women use male contacts. As a comparison
47% of men use male contacts and only 9% use female contacts. In general, she shows that
women have lower network intensity, since 56% of men use labor contacts and only 47% of
women use contacts. Fernandez and Sosa (2005) use a dataset documenting the recruitment and
hiring process for an entry level job at a call center of a large US bank. In an environment that
was mostly female dominated, they found that referrers of both genders tend to produce samesex referrals (females referred females 75.1% of the time and males referred females only 56.1%
of the time).
Another line of arguments that supports my conjecture that female wages increase with
female labor force participation is based on statistical discrimination theories (Phelps 1972,
Lundberg and Starz 1983, Coate and Loury 1993 etc.). De la Rica, Dolado and García-Peñalosa
(2008) and Escriche (2007) propose models of self-fulfilling expectations in which gender wage
gaps are results of statistical discrimination. If firms believe that women are more likely to quit
when they have children, and training workers for highly paid careers is expensive, they will be
less likely to offer the same training opportunities to women as they do to men. This in turn leads
to the existence of wage gaps which discourages even further female participation and
dynamically reinforces the mechanism that associates low participation and high gender wage
gaps. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) suggest that firms‟ expectations that women spend more time
in home production induces them to offer women a lower wage, which consequently leads
women to spend less time in the market, validating firms‟ beliefs. Since the intra-household
allocation of labor, which affects labor attachment to the market and workers‟ effort, is not
observed by the firms, the incentive constraints in the labor market lead naturally to statistical
discrimination. If women were to spend less time undertaking home tasks, and their labor market
participation were to increase exogenously, firms‟ beliefs about their likelihood to drop out
would adjust eventually and gender wage differentials would diminish.

3. The Model
I consider a model with discrete non-overlapping generations. Population is a continuum and
each individual lives for one period. Each household consists of two adults that remain married,
9

and husbands always work in the market and receive a fixed salary. Wives can work at home and
produce the “home good” or in the market in which case they receive a salary and the “home
good” is bought in the market. I assume that the level of “home good” is constant, not a choice
variable and it can be entirely produced outside the home. Household‟s consumption is made up
of non-rival public “home” and market goods to which both spouses have equal access. Each
generation of women decides on their labor participation at the beginning of their life based on
the wages, male and female, and price of “home goods” that are prevailing at that time.
In Section 3.1 I analyze the labor supply decisions of women when female wages are
exogenous. In Section 3.2 I assume that female wage depends positively on male wage and on
female participation rate in the previous period.

Preferences
Women derive utility from consumption of “home good”, market good and their relative
standing in the society. The “home good” (food, child care, etc) can be produced at home or can
be bought in the market if the woman works. The market good is bought with the husband‟s
income if the woman stays at home, or with whatever income is left after paying for the “home
good” if the woman works. Women care about their household relative standing in the society
and about their individual relative standing in the workforce if they work.
The utility function of working wives is:
(1)
Where
reflects women‟s preference for producing her own “home good”
represents the “home” good
represents the market good
represents the household income
represents the average household income
represents the female wage
represents the average wage
Finally,

are the weights that reflect the importance of different components of the utility

function.
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The parameters

reflect the fact that women‟s preferences for the “home good” bought

in the market are heterogeneous and time invariant. The “home good” that is bought in the
market is a generic good, it deviates from the exact specifications that the woman would have
achieved if she was producing it herself (formula vs. breastfeeding, supermarket muffins vs.
homemade muffins, surrogate mothers vs. pregnancy etc.). Some women care about these
deviations more than others and thus derive less utility from the consumption of the “home”
good if they buy it in the market.
I assume that all “home” goods can be bought in the market and that consumption of
“home good” is constant and equal to

. The price of that good is equal to

and can change

only exogenously, i.e. as a consequence of technological change in the production of home
appliances.
I let the price of the market good to be the numeraire. I also assume that all working
wives receive an equal wage,

, and that all husbands receive an equal wage

.2 Thus, the

quantity of the market good consumed in the household with the working wives is:

Their household‟s relative standing in the society depends on their household income
compared to the average household income,
Their individual standing in the workforce depends on their individual income,
compared to the average wage,

=

. Since all working women receive the same wage and all

husbands work and receive identical wages, the subscript i can be dropped.
The utility function of stay-at-home wives is given by:
(2)
Since the “home good” in this case is produced at home by the woman herself, she
derives utility fully from its consumption. The quantity of market good consumed in the
household with the stay-at-home wives is only a function of the husband‟s wage:

2

Suppose that everyone who decides to join the labor force supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Firms use
Ricardian technology with constant marginal productivity. Female wage can be justified to be lower that male wage
either by assuming that firms retain as surplus the difference between the marginal product of labor and female wage
or by assuming that women are less productive than men (Section 2.2).
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As she does not belong to the workforce, her relative standing in the society is defined
only as a member of the household. She cares about her household‟s implicit income
compared to the average household income,

.

Women join the labor force if the utility from working exceeds that from staying home.
Let

be the cut-off for which women with
Assuming that

and taking

work and women with

stay-at-home.

as given, the average household income is:
(3)

All households have the husband‟s wage equal to
have wives working and receiving a wage

, and

,

is the fraction of the households that
is the fraction of households that have

wives staying at home and producing the “home” good worth:

.

The average individual income is:
(4)
The labor force is made of men who all work and receive a wage
women who receive a wage

, and a fraction

of the

.

Based on historical evidence and for the purpose of having an interesting discussion
regarding female participation, I assume that:
(5a)
.

(5b)

Plugging (3) and (4) and the budget constraints into (1) and (2), and choosing functional
forms for the utility function, the utility functions of both working and stay-at-home wives can
be rewritten as:

(1‟)
Given the log utility function, the third term is always positive because

>

and

thus household status consideration always works in the favor of women who choose to work.
Alternatively, the last term is always negative because

, thus individual status

considerations always work against the women who choose to work.
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(2‟)
Given the log utility function the third terms is always negative because

>

and

thus household status consideration always works against women who choose to stay at home.
I define the function

as the difference between (2‟) and (1‟), where

needs to be

determined
(6a)
The cut-off
, such that

that gives us the fraction of women that are in the labor force is the value of
=0.

(6b)

A woman whose preference for producing her own home good is given by
between working and staying at home. If
her own home good is given by

is indifferent

>0, a woman whose preference for producing

will rather stay at home than work, therefore

. If

<0 a woman whose preference for producing her own home good is given by
rather work than stay at home, thus we have

. Depending on the parameter values of

there could be no, one or two solutions for
uniquely economically interesting solution for

will

. Under some mild conditions a

can be derived as a function of

(see Appendix and Fig.1).

3.1 Exogenous female wages
Proposition 1 (Comparative statics): The share of women that work (
reduction in the price of “home good”
and an increase in the female wage,

(
,

increases with a

, a decrease in male wage,

(

,

).

All proofs are contained in the appendix. A decrease in the price of “home good” will
make women more likely to work as they pay less to acquire the home good” from the market,
and it also improves their household income relative to that of the stay-at-home wives. The effect
on equilibrium female labor force participation is thus much stronger than in the case where we
do not incorporate relative standing of household income in female utility function.
A decrease in male wage increases female labor participation for several reasons. Firstly,
all households suffer a loss in income, and thus a decrease in the consumption of the market
13

good, but since the household income of working wives is higher, their utility loss is lower.
Secondly, as male wage represents a smaller proportion of their household income, their
household position improves relative to that of the stay-at-home wives. And finally, their relative
wage increases as male wage decreases, and their own wage stays constant.
An increase in female wage makes women more likely to join the labor force as they can
consume more market good, their household income increases relative to that of the stay-at-home
wives and their individual income increases as well relative to that of their male colleagues.
Corollary 1: Female participation is more sensitive to changes in female wages than to changes
in male wages.
.
Lemma 1: The share of women that work (
more important for welfare, (
important

increases if relative household concerns become

and if relative individual wage concerns become less

.

Different types of relative concerns have different effects on female participation.
Increase in importance of relative household position makes women more likely to work, as the
household status consideration always works in the favor of women who choose to work.
Increase in the importance of relative individual position makes women less likely to work as
individual status considerations always work against the women who choose to work.
Proposition 2: A decrease in

has a negative effect on the average wage (

ambiguous effects on the average household income (
a positive effect on the average wage
income (
(

. Finally, an increase in

Also, an increase in

has

, and ambiguous effects on average household
ambiguous effects on the average wage

and a positive effect on the average household income (
A decrease in

, and

.

leads to an increase in female participation (Proposition 1). The average

income of the household where the wife stays at home decreases. Depending on how many
women join the labor force and the extent of their additional income (difference between gained
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wages and the value of the home good that they now buy), the overall effect on the average
household income can be either positive or negative. Additionally, as more women are in the
labor force, the average wage in the economy decreases.
An increase in

leads to an increase in the income of each household. However, the

same increase also leads to a decrease in female participation (Proposition 1) and thus income
loses for each household whose woman switches to produce a home good whose value is less
that the wage she used to receive. Additionally, as fewer women remain in the labor force and
the male wage increases, the average wage in the economy increases.
An increase in

leads to an increase in the income of each household with working

women. It also leads to increased female participation (Proposition 1), and thus brings additional
income due to the difference between female wage and the value of the home good.
Additionally, as more women enter the labor force the average wage should decrease. Given that
the wages of the women that were already working increased however the overall effect on the
average wage in the economy is ambiguous.
As long as there is an interior solution for the fraction of women working (i.e.

)

I define the “perennial” working woman as the woman who would work regardless of whether
). Similarly I define the “perennial” stay-at-home wife as

the shocks studied occur (i.e.

the woman who would stay at home regardless of whether the shocks studied occur (i.e.

).

Thus all the results that refer to the “perennial” woman, either working or stay-at-home, refer to
cases when we have interior solutions for
limiting cases, when

or

both before and after the economic shock3. The

, are discussed separately when they offer interesting

insights.
Proposition 3 (Welfare implications of a change in the price of “home good” on the
“perennial” woman): A decrease in the price of “home good” (

has a negative effect on the

welfare of the “perennial” stay-at-home wife and an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the
“perennial” working wife. If all women already work (i.e.

a decrease in

has an

unambiguously positive effect on the welfare of the working wife.
The decrease in welfare enjoyed by stay-at-home wives is related strictly to their
household relative standing. The value of the good produced by them decreases, which in turn
3

Since women only live for one period, the “perennial” either working or stay-at- home woman refers to the women
that share the same characteristics (i.e. ), not to the same woman per se.
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reduces both the absolute and relative value of their household and, as more women join the
labor force, their relative household income deteriorates even more.
As the price of “home goods” decreases, the working wives can buy more of the market
good. Since the value produced by the stay-at-home wives decreases, their relative household
standing improves. Thus if participation rate stayed constant, the working women would be
unambiguously better off. However, as more women join the labor force the average household
income in the economy might increase, and thus their relative position might deteriorate.
Additionally, as more women are in the labor force which reduces the average wage in the
economy, their individual income improves. Thus, most factors point in the direction that a
decrease in “home goods” price would have a positive effect on the welfare of the “perennial”
working women.
Lemma 2: The average welfare of stay-at-home wives is equal to each stay-at-home wive’s
welfare and the average welfare of working wives depends on the fraction of women that work
( ).
Lemma 3: If all women work (

) change in welfare of each working women is identical to

the average change in welfare of working women.
Corollary 2 (Welfare implications on the “average” woman): A decrease in the price of
“home good” (

has an ambiguous effect on the average utility of working wives. If all women

work (i.e.

a decrease in

has an unambiguously positive effect on the average welfare

of the working wives.
Compared to the welfare of the “perennial” working woman, when we analyze the
welfare of the average women we have to take into consideration additional compositional
effects. The women that join the labor force as a consequence of the decrease in the price of
“home good” are women that suffer a stronger disutility from not producing their own “home
good”. Overall these combined effects imply that the average working woman, who, it needs to
be underlined, is different from the average working woman when
off as a consequence of an decrease in

was higher, may be worse

under a wider set of parameters.

Using Proposition 3 and Lemma 3, it is apparent that if all women work both before and
after the shock (

) a decrease in the price of “home good”, has a consistently positive effect

on the average utility of working wives.
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Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) argued that the decrease in women happiness, which is
contemporaneous with increased female participation rates, might be explained by the fact that
women in the labor force are exposed to new reference groups. Proposition 3 and Corollary 2
shows that, in fact, status concern at household level, not at the individual level, is the
fundamental factor that might lead to a decrease in happiness of the average working woman. If
we assume that this status concern is not present, stay-at-home wives‟ utility would then stay
constant when the price of “home goods” changes, since their utility would depend only on the
level of goods that they produce, not their price. In this case an increase in women„s participation
in the context of a decrease in the price of “home good” would be possible only if working
women‟s utility were higher than the utility of those wives that stayed at home, thus a higher
utility than what they experienced before, when the price of “home goods” was higher.
Proposition 4 (Welfare implications of a change in the price of male wages on the
“perennial” woman): An increase in male wage

has a positive effect on the welfare of

the “perennial” stay-at-home wife and an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the “perennial”
working wife.
Stay-at-home wives enjoy an increase in welfare as a consequence of the increase in their
husband‟s wages since they have access to more of the market good. Additionally their relative
household position improves for two reasons: their husband‟s income represents a bigger share
of their household worth and as the share of women working decreases, the average household
income becomes closer to their own household income.
Working wives enjoy more of the market good, but their relative status as individual
workers deteriorates as gender gap increases and there are fewer women in the working force
which pushes the average wage up. The effect on their household relative position is ambiguous:
on the one hand, as their husband‟s income represents a smaller share of their household worth,
their household status deteriorates, but on the other hand as fewer women work, their household
income is proportionally higher than the average in the economy.
Corollary 3 (Welfare implications on the “average” woman): An increase in male wage,
has an ambiguous effect on the average welfare of working wives.
Compared to the welfare of the “perennial” working woman when we analyze the welfare
of the average woman, we have to take into consideration additional compositional effects. The
women that drop out the labor force as a consequence of the increase in male wages are women
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that suffer a stronger disutility from not producing their own “home good”. Thus on the average
the working women are more likely to be better off than the “perennial” woman if male wages
increase.
Proposition 5 (Welfare implications of a change in the female wages on the “perennial”
woman): An increase in female wage

has negative effects on the welfare of the

“perennial” stay-at-home wife and an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the “perennial”
working wife.
The decrease in the welfare enjoyed by stay-at-home wives is related strictly to their
household relative standing. The increased wages that working women earn diminish their
household relative worth and, as more women join the labor force, their relative household
standing decreases even more.
As their wage increases, working wives can buy more of the market good. Also their
individual standing improves due to the reduction in the gender gap and the fact that more
women joining the labor forces brings the average wage in the economy closer to their own
wage. The effect on the relative household income is ambiguous. Their absolute household
income increases as their wage increases, but as more women join the labor force the average
household income in the economy increases as well, and thus their relative position might
deteriorate. If all women work

, an increase in

has an unambiguously positive

effect on the welfare of the working wife. Thus, most factors point in the direction that an
increase in the female wage would improve the welfare of the “perennial” working women.
Corollary 4 (Welfare implications of a change in the female wages on the “average”
woman): An increase in female wage has an ambiguous effect on the average welfare of
working wives.
When we analyze the welfare of the average woman, we have to take into consideration
additional compositional effects compared to the welfare of the “perennial” working woman.
The women that join the labor force as a consequence of the increase in female wages are
women that suffer a stronger disutility from not producing their own “home good”. Overall these
combined effects imply that the average working woman may be worse off as a consequence of
an increase in

under quite realistic assumptions. However, if all women already work

an increase in

has an unambiguously positive effect on the welfare of the working

wife.
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This analysis was made assuming that female wages are exogenous. In Section 3.2 I assume
that female wages are a function of male wages and past female labor force participation. These
conjectures are based on the fact that technological advances in the market place are going to
affect the demand for labor in general, being it male or female. I assume that female and male
labor would be perfect substitutes. However, given the different historical trajectory in the labor
market, women are at a disadvantage in obtaining the same jobs that men do, and thus are being
paid a lower salary. If all women were in the labor market, then female and male wages would be
identical.

3.2 Endogenous female wages
I assume that female wages are a function of male wages and female labor force participation
in the past:
(7)
Where

can be greater than, less than, or equal to one, thus female wage can be

increasing, decreasing or a linear function of the past participation rate. The three different cases
will have different implications on the hysteresis associated with the entrance or exit from the
labor market of married women.
Given that in equilibrium

, equilibrium female participation can be derived using (6b)

and (7). The slope as given by (7) is

and its curvature depends

on the level of

iff

wages as given by both (6b) and (7) are upward sloping in
exists at most one stable solution for (

in

(Eq. 7), and

disequilibrium such that
leads to a decrease in

leads to an increase in

(see also Fig 2a,b and c), there

under some mild stability conditions (see

Appendix). If we start from a disequilibrium such that
given by (6b), a higher

. Given that female

as given by (7) is higher than

as

(Proposition 1), which leads to an increase

after several iterations equilibrium is reached. If we start from a
as given by (7) is lower than

as given by (6b), the lower

(Proposition 1), which leads to an decrease in

(Eq. 7), and after

several iterations equilibrium is reached.

19

Proposition 6 (Comparative statics): A reduction in the price of “home good”
increase in the share of women that work (

, as well as female wages (

decrease in gender wage gap (

An increase in male wage,

increase in female participation

female wage

effects on gender wage gap

.

leads to an
0 and a
leads to an

and has ambiguous

A decrease in the price of “home good” leads to an increase in the share of women that
work (Proposition 1) and given (7) to an increase in female wages in equilibrium. As male wages
stay constant the gender gap decreases.
An increase in male wage instantaneously leads to an increase in female wage which
would encourage women to join the labor force (Proposition 1). Simultaneously, the increase in
male wage, by increasing the utility of stay-at-home wives relative to working wives,
discourages women from joining the labor force (Proposition 1). In this set-up, with the
conditions attached to the existence of a stable equilibrium, the first effect on female
participation always dominates.
What is interesting about these results is that a change in male wages has the opposite
effect on female participation than it did when female wages were exogenous. Male wages are
directly affecting female wages and participation, and female wages are subsequently affecting
their participation. This indirect effect on participation turns out to be more important than the
direct one if a stable equilibrium is to be reached. Intuitively this result is due to the fact that
abstracting from the feedback effect that participation has on female wages, female participation
is much more sensitive to changes in female wages than to changes in male wages (Corollary 1).
Lemma 4: The share of women that work (

and female wage (

household concerns become more important for welfare (
wage concerns become less important (

increases if relative

) and if relative individual

.

An increase in the importance of relative household position makes women more likely
to work, whereas increase in the importance of relative individual position makes women less
likely to work (Lemma 1). Relative concerns affect female wage only through their effect on
labor participation.
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Proposition 7: A decrease in

has an ambiguous effect on average household income (

and average wage (
household income (

. An increase in

has a positive effect on average

and the average wage as

What is remarkable compared to Proposition 2 is that an increase in
associated with an increase in

and

, given that it is

, has a clear positive effect on average household

income, as opposed to an effect on the average individual income only. Also contrasting with
Proposition 2, a decrease in

, by increasing female participation, affects

positively, and

these two effects combined lead to an uncertain effect on the average individual wage.

3.3.1 Dynamics and hysteresis
I first analyze the dynamic effects that a decrease in the price of “home”,
female participation,

and wage,

has on

. A reduction in the price of “home good” p, encourages

women to join the labor force (Proposition 1). The increase in the share of women that work,
leads to an increase in female wages, which also has a positive effect on labor participation.
Thus the adjustment to the higher levels of female participation and wages takes place
monotonically.
Secondly, I analyze the dynamic effects that an increase in male wage,
female participation,

and wage,

has on

. The increase in male wage leads to an increase in female

wage which affects positively participation rate. The increase in

in subsequent generations

leads to even more increases in female wages which encourages more women to work. This
dynamic process diffuses throughout several generations of women and will lead eventually to
the new steady-state equilibrium where wages of women and labor force participation are higher
than before.
Due to the existence of two possible equilibria, one stable and one unstable, the entrance
and exit trajectory in the labor force as a consequence of changes in male wages and price of
“home” goods might not be symmetrical. The shape of the labor demand function, whether it is
increasing, decreasing or linear in female participation ( can be greater than, less than, or equal
to one) affects the type of hysteresis that could arise. The following sections analyze each case
in detail.
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3.3.2 Hysteresis when

>1

If there are two solution for

in the interval [0,1] the stable one is the smaller one (Fig.

2a). In this case, hysteresis is likely if the economy experience full female participation.
Fig. 3a, b, c and d are the graphical representation of different cases of hysteresis when
Starting from interior solution equilibrium, changes in any of the exogenous variables
lead to the expected variation in the endogenous variables (Proposition 6). There exist certain
thresholds

and

equal to zero,

such that if
and

and respectively

women‟s participation is

. However, if the economy starts from an equilibrium with

full female participation,

we have two cases: (1) permanent hysteresis when full

participation is irreversible and (2) temporary hysteresis when full participation is reversible as
long as there exist

and respectively p* at which our system has only one stable and no

unstable equilibrium for
is 100% and once

. In case (2) as long as

(p<p*) female participation

or in case of the price of “home” good p raises above p*

drops below

women‟s participation will decrease.
Thus, a small variation in the male wage (price of “home good”) from a value that
implies full participation can have dramatically different effects on female participation and
wages. Fig. 3a 3b, 3c, and 3d shows that for the same value of

between

and

we can have female full participation or not depending on the history.

3.3.3 Hysteresis when
If there are two solution for

in the interval [0,1] the stable one is the bigger one (Fig.

2b and c). In this case, hysteresis is likely if the economy starts from zero female participation.
Fig. 4a, b, c and d are the graphical representation of different cases of hysteresis when
. If we start from interior solution equilibrium, changes in any of the exogenous variables
lead to the expected variation in the endogenous variables (Proposition 6). There exist certain
thresholds

and

participation,

such that if
and

participation is null

and respectively

there is full women‟s

. However if we start from an equilibrium in which female
there are two cases that can follow: (1) permanent hysteresis when no

participation is immutable and (2) temporary hysteresis when no participation is not permanent,
as long as there exist
unstable equilibrium for

and respectively p* at which our system has only one stable and no
. In case (2) as long as

(p>p*) there is no female
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participation,

, but if

(p p*) women‟s participation jumps to the equilibrium

level that is implied by the parameters of the model and has no historical influence.
Thus, a small variation in the male wage (price of “home good”) from a value that
implies no participation can have dramatically different effects on female participation and
wages. Fig. 4a, b, c and d show that for the same value of

between

and

we can have female no participation or not depending on the starting equilibrium
point.
Proposition 8 (Welfare implications of a change in price of “home good” on the “perennial”
woman): A decrease in the price of “home good” (

has a negative effect on the welfare of the

”perennial” stay-at-home wife and an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the “perennial”
working wife.
The decrease in welfare enjoyed by stay-at-home wives as a consequence of a reduction
in the price of home goods is related strictly to their household relative standing. Incorporating
the fact that female wages also increase, the reduction in welfare is more significant than when
female wages were exogenous.
Similarly, the effect on the welfare of the working women is complicated by the
endogeneity of female wages. The increase in female wages as a result of increased participation
introduces additional sources of ambiguity with respect to the effect on women‟ welfare, as
Proposition 4 indicates. The main source of negativity in working women‟s welfare comes from
relative concerns at household level. As participation increases, the woman that was working
even before the shock will face a decline in its household relative income which might
counterbalance all the positive effects that are brought by increased ability to buy market good
and improved individual standing.
If all women work (

a decrease in

has an unambiguously positive effect the

welfare of the working wife as in Proposition 3, as neither female participation nor do wages
change.
Corollary 5 (Welfare implications of a change in price of “home good” on the average
woman): A decrease in the price of “home good”

has an ambiguous effect on the average

welfare of working wives.
The additional compositional effects brought about by increased labor participation
would tend to lower the welfare of the average working woman compared to the “perennial” one.
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Proposition 9 (Welfare implications of a change in male wages on the “perennial” woman):
An increase in male wages

has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of both the”

perennial” stay-at-home and working wife.
An increase in male wage leads to an improvement in stay-at-home wives‟ ability to buy
more market good and improve their relative status (Proposition 4).Since this change in male
wages leads to an increase in female wages as well (Proposition 6), which has a negative effect
on the welfare of staying-at-home wives (Proposition 5), the overall welfare effect is ambiguous.
Corollary 6 (Welfare implications of a change in male wages on the average woman) An
increase in male wages

has an ambiguous effect on the average welfare of the working

wives.
The additional compositional effects brought about by increased labor participation would
tend to lower the welfare of the average compared to the “perennial” working woman.

4. Conclusions
Female labor participation increased dramatically over the past half of century in most
industrialized countries. Some of the factors that lead to this development, by most objective
criteria, should have also lead to increases in women‟s welfare. Yet Stevenson and Wolfers
(2009) show that during this time, women's well-being declined, and this trend can be found
across demographic groups and industrialized countries.
In this paper, I present a discrete generation model that incorporates relative concerns at
household and individual level to analyze different factors that contributed to the increase in
labor participation of married women, as well as their effects on average household income and
wage in the economy, in addition to female welfare.
Reductions in the price of “home goods” and increases in female wages have a positive effect
on the female participation rate. Increases in male wages have different effects on female
participation depending on whether they affect female wages or not. For instance, if female
wages are independent variables, an increase in male wages decreases female participation.
However if female wages are positive functions of male wages, the increase in male wages leads
to increased female participation even if they are not associated with a decrease in gender wage
gap.
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The effects of these economic shocks on the average household and individual incomes are
of particular interest. An increase in female wages will always be associated with an increase in
average household income, but not necessarily with an increase in average wage. An increase in
male wage leads to an increase in the average wage in the economy, but not necessarily in the
average household income‟s depending on whether female wages are independent or positive
functions of male wages.
Assuming that female wages are positive functions of both male wages and past participation
rates, I show that female participation in the labor market can be subject to hysteresis (i.e. if
female wage is an increasing (linear or diminishing) function of past participation rates,
hysteresis is possible if the economy starts from full (zero) participation rate).
Furthermore, the welfare effects of different economic shocks are analyzed, both at
individual levels and at averages across the economy. These experiments show that most factors
that lead to increases in female participation are usually associated with decreases in the welfare
of stay-at-home wives, but surprisingly are not necessarily associated with increases in the
welfare of working wives. These results hold true both if the focus is on the welfare of women
that were working before and after the shock, or on the average of the working women
population. The ambiguities in the welfare results are consequences of the difficulty to quantify
the changes that occur in relative household income and relative wage of the working women.
Thus a reduction in the price of “home good” might improve the working women household
standing given that the value of the stay–at-home wives‟ households decreases by the value of
the “home good” as expressed by price. However, as more women join the labor force, the
average household income in the economy might increases, and thus its relative position might
deteriorate. Similarly, changes in both male and female wages affect the participation rate, as
well as the average household and individual income and relative standings. The sum of all
these effects on the overall welfare of working wives) is therefore uncertain. Thus, ironically, the
push for increased female participation would not necessarily lead to an increase in the working
women welfare, even if these working women would enjoy the higher wages associated with
higher participation.
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Appendix
Stability condition for
From 6.a I define

as the difference between the welfare of stay-at-home and working

wives. Thus, if there exist a stable interior solution for

, then

. The stability condition in this case is

and
, thus

(1A)
Proof of Proposition 1
Applying the implicit equation theory for (6b), using (5a) and (5b), and imposing the stability
condition (1A):
(2A.a)

(2A.b)

(2A.c)
Proof of Corollary 1
Direct consequence of (5a), (5b) applied to (2A.b) and (2A.c)
Proof of Lemma 1
Applying the implicit equation theory for (6b), using (5a) and (5b), and imposing the stability
condition (1A):
(2A.d)

(2A.e)
Proof of Proposition 2
Using (3) and (2A.a):
(3A.a)
Using (4) and (2Aa):
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(3A.b)
Using (3) and (2A.b.):
(3A.c)
Using (4) and (2Ab) :
(3A.d)
Using (3) and (2Ac):
(3A.e)
Using (4) and (2Ac):
(3A.f)
Proof of Proposition 3
Using (2‟), (5a), and (2Aa):

Using (1‟), (5a), (5b) and (2Aa):

If
Proof of Lemma 2
As stay-at-home wives produce their own “home” good using (2‟) it is inferred that their welfare
is equal such that:
As working wives buy their “home” good and have heterogeneous preferences for producing it
themselves, using (1‟) and (6) their average welfare can be written as:
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Proof of Lemma 3

for any

given that

Proof of Corollary 2
Using Lemma 2, assumptions (5a) and (5b), and (2Aa):

If
Proof of Proposition 4
Using (2‟), (5a) and (2Ab):

Using (1‟), (5a), (5b) and (2Ab):

Proof of Corollary 3
Using Lemma 2, (5a), (5b) and (2Ab):

Proof of Proposition 5
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Using (1‟), (5a) and (2Ac):

Using (2‟), (5a), (5b) and (2Ac):

If

then

Proof of Corollary 4
Using Lemma 2 and Proposition 4:

If

then

Stability condition for
I derive the slope of

as a function of

as:
(4Aa)

I rewrite (2Ac) to derive the slope:
(4Ab)
The curvature of the function as given by (7) depends on
iff

(4Ac)

Whereas the function as given by (6b) is always concave:
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>0

(4Ad)
If there exist an interior solution for

the stability condition for it is that
(4Ae).

Proof of Proposition 6
Plug (10) into (6b) to determine

and

, as well as the partial derivatives that reflect the

effect that changes in the exogenous parameters

have on female labor force

participation and female wages

(5Aa)
where

From the stability condition (4Ae).

Using (5Aa) and (4Ae) it is thus shown that if a stable interior solution exists
(5Ab)
and

.

(5Ac)

Using (10), (5Ab) and (5Ac):
(6Aa)
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(6Ab)
(6Ac)
Proof of Lemma 4

Proof of Proposition 7
Using (3), (5Ac), (6Ab) and assumptions (5a) and (5b):
(7Aa)
Using (4), (5Ac), (6Ab) and assumptions (5a) and (5b):
(7Ab)
Using (3), (5Ab), (6Aa) and assumptions (5a) and (5b):
(7Ac)
Using (4), (5Ab), (6Aa) and assumptions (5a) and (5b):
(7Ad)
Proof of Proposition 8
Using (2‟), (5a), (5Ac) and (6Ab):

Using (1‟), (5a), (5b), (5Ac) and (6Ab) it can be proven that:
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Proof of Corollary 5
Using Proposition 8 and Lemma 2:

Proof of Proposition 9
Using (2‟), (5a), (5Ab) and (6Aa):

Using (1‟), (5a), (5b), (5Ab) and (6Aa):

Proof of Corollary 6
Using Proposition 8 and Lemma 2:
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